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ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) has been buﬀeted by a range of crises since 2007, not
least the economic and ﬁnancial crisis. One potential victim of this economic
malaise is environmental policy ambition. It is well-established that during
economic crises environmental policy slips down the agenda with long term
consequences for environmental quality. The EU has sought to cast itself as a
global environmental leader but that leadership has in large part rested upon
its ability to set ambitious policy goals at home. The future environmental
policy trajectory and leadership of the EU may be under threat as the Union
struggles to emerge from the economic crisis. This article presents a
comprehensive and robust analysis of all environmental policy outputs
adopted by the EU over a ten-year period covering the crisis. This legislative
analysis is supplemented by interviews with policy stakeholders. The article
ﬁnds evidence of waning ambition over the period under analysis but a range
of explanatory variables emerges from the interviews, which suggests that the
diminution in EU environmental policy ambition is driven by a mix of factors
and maybe likely to persist over the longer term.
KEYWORDS: Economic crisis; environmental policy; European Union (EU); ﬁnancial crisis policy dismantling
Introduction
It is a timely moment to review whether and how the most signiﬁcant econ-
omic and ﬁnancial crisis since the 1930s has had a discernible eﬀect upon
environmental policy ambition. This article does so by taking the case of
the European Union (EU), which has sought to promote itself as an environ-
mental leader on the international stage (Kilian and Elgström 2010; Parker
and Karlsson 2010). We analyse all EU environmental policy outputs over
ten years straddling the crisis, to determine whether there is any evidence
of a crisis ‘eﬀect’. This analysis is complemented by interviews with key
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stakeholders to gain a fully rounded picture of the main factors that have
inﬂuenced EU environmental policy ambition. As such, the article oﬀers a
robust and comprehensive empirical evaluation of the impact of the crisis
upon the EU’s environmental policy outputs and thereby makes a signiﬁcant
contribution to our understanding of an important environmental policy
actor.
There is now a vast literature on European environmental policy from
which it is possible to identify several core arguments. Environmental legis-
lation was a signiﬁcant component of the single market agenda, as policy
was designed to establish a level-playing ﬁeld across the EU. The 1980s and
early 1990s were the high point in policy activity (Weale 1996), when it was
assumed that the EU’s environmental policy was expansionary (Weale
1999), driven forward by ambitious pioneer states (Lieﬀerink and Andersen
1997) who competed to upload environmental policy to the EU level
(Börzel 2002; Jordan and Lieﬀerink 2005). In the late 1990s and early 2000s
the Commission was keen to see the EU assume a leadership mantle in inter-
national environmental diplomacy following the US withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol and the EU has sought to develop its role as a global environ-
mental leader (Wurzel et al. 2017). Yet there have always been challenges. Key
states have resisted further environmental policy integration, most notably
the UK, which has also pushed a deregulation agenda at the EU level
(Collier 1998). In addition, since 2004 the EU has enlarged to the East and
South, bringing in poorer states where environmental policy is not a priority
(Braun 2014).
Since the onset of the global economic and ﬁnancial crisis in the late 2000s
the EU has been overwhelmed by a conglomerate of crises (Falkner 2016)
combined with waning popularity (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Serricchio et al.
2013). It has been suggested that we are now in an era of disintegration (Rosa-
mond 2016) and dismantling (Gravey and Jordan 2016), exempliﬁed by the
UK’s vote to leave the European Union (Schimmelfennig 2018). Some
authors have pointed to the reassertion of control by the Council especially
in the ﬁeld of economic governance (Bickerton et al. 2015). For environmental
policy it has been suggested that the former green pioneers no longer want to
lead (Wurzel et al. 2017), the EU appeared to have lost its leadership mantle in
environmental diplomacy (Parker et al. 2012) and there are some indications
that environmental ambition is stalling or even reversing (Gravey and Jordan
2016; Steinebach and Knill 2017).
Compelling though such bleak visions are, it is important to subject them
to rigorous empirical evaluation. This article seeks to review the claim that
environmental policy ambition is stalling or reversing by drawing upon the lit-
erature on ‘policy dismantling’ as an analytical framework and deploying a
novel typology for coding legislation. We concentrate upon this question of
dismantling because so much of the EU’s reputation for being an
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environmental policy actor and global leader rests upon its ability to produce
ambitious policy outputs. If that is no longer the case, the understanding we
have of the EU as an environmental policy actor requires revision.
We ﬁnd that there was, at least in the short term, a ‘crisis eﬀect’ revealed by
a decline in the amount of EU environmental legislation brought forward and
in the ambition of new legislation. However, whilst the immediate drop in
policy activity in 2009 can almost certainly be attributed to the crisis the
reasons for the subsequent shift are less clear. From interviews, we ﬁnd
three further explanatory themes that inﬂuenced recent environmental
policy-making; pre-existing preferences for deregulation; increased diversity
of EU members; and the maturity of the acquis communautaire. The picture
that emerges is not one of a crisis ridden Union intent upon rolling back its
environmental ambitions, but of a surprisingly resilient environmental
policy actor that in the face of enormous challenges managed to keep the
show on the road. Nevertheless, the combination of perceived policy satur-
ation with the increased diversity of EU members leads us to suggest that
the high period of EU environmental policy ambition looks to be over.
Crisis and the EU’s environmental policy
Environmental commentators suggested in the immediate aftermath of the
global ﬁnancial crisis that it presented a unique opportunity to remodel the
dominant neoliberal economic paradigm towards a low or no-growth
model (Lipietz 2013; McCarthy 2012). The European Commission launched
an ambitious 2020 strategy calling for a new era of sustainable, inclusive
and low carbon growth (2010a). However, early studies suggest less positive
outcomes: Lekakis and Kousis (2013) note the unintended environmental con-
sequences in Greece resulting from economic policies adopted as a condition
of receiving economic aid. Skovgaard (2014) suggests that the economic crisis
has led to deeper divisions between EU Member State governments, shifting
the way in which climate policy is framed and discussed away from environ-
mental goals to purely economic ones. In the UK, Russel and Benson (2014)
identiﬁed a shift from green stimulus measures to implementing cuts in
environmental budgets as the economic recession deepened.
One response of governments faced with economic crisis is to cut expen-
diture and roll back policy. The framework of policy dismantling has emerged
as a popular tool for analysing attempts to cut, weaken or remove existing
policy (Jordan et al. 2013). Knill et al. (2009) tried to develop a better under-
standing of policy dismantling by distinguishing between policy density (the
number of pieces of legislation proposed or passed) and the intensity of par-
ticular initiatives (the level of their ambition). As states often struggle to
achieve policy retrenchment (Pierson 1994) they deploy other strategies;
rather than rolling back existing legislation they may reduce or weaken
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new policy proposals, or use diﬀerent legislative instruments to reduce costs
to the state (i.e., voluntary measures). These strategies are commonly termed
dismantling by default – rather than actively removing policy (active disman-
tling), states scale back policy ambition (and costs) in other ways (Knill et al.
2009).
Environmental regulations are particularly vulnerable to dismantling, as
their potential beneﬁts are diﬃcult to quantify, may be long-term, and do
not accrue to speciﬁc high-proﬁle client groups, while powerful actors often
have an interest in lowering standards (Jordan et al. 2013). Several studies
have developed ways of categorising potential dismantling. Steinebach and
Knill (2017) developed a comprehensive hierarchy of policy items, policy
instruments and settings to analyse EU air and water policy, ﬁnding evidence
of dismantling in the immediate aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. Gravey and
Jordan (2016) in seeking evidence of dismantling, selected cases subject to
dismantling rhetoric and assessed the intensity, settings and scope of those
regulations, again ﬁnding evidence of dismantling.
These studies have provided valuable insights, by for example, demonstrat-
ing that despite the diﬃculty of changing EU decisions, it is still possible to
dismantle legislation (Gravey and Jordan 2016) and suggesting that in air
and water policy there was some time-limited crisis eﬀect (Steinebach and
Knill 2017). However, these pieces provide a partial picture: they do not rep-
resent a comprehensive analysis of all environmental policy change before
and after the crisis, nor have they been complemented by substantial
ﬁeldwork that can explain the reasons for any change. For example, on air
and water quality the introduction of fewer policies may simply reﬂect a
shift in environmental policy priorities to reﬂect emerging challenges, such
as climate change. It is consequently important to take a holistic and inclusive
approach. Building upon the work of Knill et al. (2009) and Jordan et al. (2013)
this article utilises the concept of policy dismantling to capture potential shifts
in EU environmental ambition. We take policy change as our dependent vari-
able, which we measure by analysing shifts in policy outputs (i.e., legislation),
which provide the principal vehicle through which policy goals are articulated
and outcomes achieved. We evaluate: (i) policy density, i.e., how much policy is
being brought forward; and (ii) policy intensity, a qualitative measure of the
stringency of policy measures. Drawing upon existing work, (e.g., Gravey
and Jordan 2016; Steinebach and Knill 2017) we developed the following
hypotheses:
H1: There has been a decline in environmental policy density at the EU level
since the global ﬁnancial crisis;
H2: There has been a decline in environmental policy intensity at the EU level
since the global ﬁnancial crisis.
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Method
To test these hypotheses we reviewed proposals for environmental legislation
over a ten-year period, covering the two Barroso Commissions from Septem-
ber 2004 to July 2014, which straddle the crisis period. By reviewing this
decade, we gain an initial snapshot of any immediate eﬀects of the crisis
upon environmental policy ambition. We chose to analyse environmental
policy adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure and used Eur-Lex
and the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory to identify relevant
pieces of legislation. We identiﬁed 68 environmental policy proposals that
were proposed and adopted between September 2004 and July 2014.1
These selection criteria mean that some policies that were completed
after our timeframe, were initiated earlier or were communications rather
than legislation, were not included. In addition, we do not review comitol-
ogy measures or delegated legislation. Nevertheless, the breadth of policy
areas and the number of cases covered are suﬃcient to ensure that we
accurately capture the main patterns of environmental policy activity
during the period.
To evaluate the relative stringency of the proposals (policy intensity) we
used four indicators. First, we devised a ﬁve-point scale for categorising inten-
sity, building upon the work of Burns and Carter (2010), who coded the
environmental ambition of European Parliament amendments. Our work
departs from Gravey and Jordan (2016) and Steinebach and Knill (2017) by
having an explicitly environmental focus. We also depart from Burns and
Carter (2010), by focussing upon legislation rather than individual amend-
ments. Our assumption was that if dismantling were occurring it would mani-
fest through weaker legislation (e.g., Gravey and Jordan 2016; Jordan et al.
2013). Each piece of legislation was coded according to ambition when ﬁrst
proposed by the Commission and when ﬁnally adopted by the Council.
Since previous studies have found that dismantling tends to be both
diﬃcult and not especially signiﬁcant, we did not expect to ﬁnd many items
of legislation that substantially weakened the intensity of environmental
policy. Thus, we developed only one category below the neutral, status
quo, option (to code legislation of ‘negative ambition’), and three (‘limited
ambition’, ‘moderate ambition’ and ‘high ambition’, respectively) for initiatives
that increased current levels of protection. When classifying each piece of
legislation, we considered the following factors: the signiﬁcance of any
changes to pollution limits or levies; how the policy would be implemented
and enforced; the timescales and deadlines for compliance; and whether it
would apply to all member states. Table 1 explains the criteria for each cat-
egory in more detail.
By its nature, this process of analysing and coding legislation involved sub-
jective and normative judgements, and some items were more diﬃcult to
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categorise than others. We had to weigh the impact of changes that strength-
ened policy in some areas but weakened it in others. We also found within the
same legislation activities were promoted that some would view as beneﬁcial
but others would criticise. For example, the Commission proposal for a Fuel
Quality Directive sought initially to encourage the use of crop biofuels in
order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, despite the implications of this
approach for food production and land use (European Commission 2007).
Consequently, we judged this legislation to be of ‘limited ambition’ and
gave it a coding of 3 (see Table 1). A ﬁnal issue concerns temporal context:
inevitably our understanding of policy and expectations of what is ambitious
reﬂects the temporal context and scientiﬁc understanding at the time
decisions were made. The policy status quo was taken as a departure point
along with contextual knowledge of best practice and understanding of the
nature of the problem at the time policy was agreed. This was determined
through reviewing legislative documents, such as the Commission’s explana-
tory memoranda and where necessary contemporary grey literature and
media reports.
In addition to coding legislation, we also recorded the policy areas covered
by each piece of legislation (e.g., air, water, climate, waste, information). This
coding enabled us to determine whether there were any patterns in the legis-
lation being brought forward, as it is quite common to see packages of legis-
lation that cover particular policy areas. We also coded each piece of
legislation according to whether it proposed an entirely new piece of legis-
lation or amended or updated an existing policy. We might, for example,
expect in the post-crisis era to see fewer new proposals brought forward
and a shift to updating existing legislation.
Finally, we conducted 46 qualitative interviews in September 2013 and
April to June 2015 with policy-makers in Brussels to understand how legis-
lation aligned with political priorities and the reasons for any policy change.
Interviewees included MEPs, oﬃcials from the Council, the Committee of
Table 1. Environmental ambition typology.
5 High ambition: includes ambitious and binding targets/limits/standards that are more stringent than
previous legislation (e.g., they signiﬁcantly reduce existing pollution limits or require member states
to levy much higher taxes on polluters). Legislation includes clear and speciﬁc deadlines that apply
to all member states. Involves credible monitoring and enforcement, with provisions for resources
and training if necessary.
4 Moderate ambition: targets or levies that build upon the status quo but are less ambitious than strong
high ambition. Deadlines are included but with long timeframes or derogations. Limited monitoring
and resources.
3 Standards represent an increase on the status quo, but are voluntary. Enforcement relies on
persuasion rather than legal structures.
2 Neutral: no discernible environmental impact (maintains status quo). Typically editorial and neutral
amendments.
1 Negative ambition: weakens status quo by, for example, reducing/weakening targets, extending
deadlines.
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Permanent Representatives, the Commission, and representatives of non-gov-
ernmental organisations. These interview data enabled us to gain ﬁrst-hand
insights into how these actors perceived the impact of the economic and
ﬁnancial crisis upon environmental policy ambition.2
Findings
In keeping with other recent studies (Gravey and Jordan 2016; Kassim et al.
2017; Steinebach and Knill 2017), we identiﬁed a signiﬁcant drop in the
density of EU environmental policy proposals in the years immediately fol-
lowing the ﬁnancial crisis (see Figure 1). Dating the impacts of the crisis is
challenging. BNP Paribas suspended funds in August 2007 in response to
the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, triggering the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis,
which in turn triggered the EU’s debt crisis from 2009 onwards. The
impact of these multiple crises upon legislative activity appears to manifest
itself in 2009–10. It is worth noting that as our data commence with the
beginning of the ﬁrst Barroso Commission (September 2004) the number
of policy proposals in 2004 appears low. One of our interviewees suggested
that there was a period of reﬂection at the start of the ﬁrst Barroso Commis-
sion about strategic direction (Interview 1, 2013), which may explain this
ﬁnding. Barroso (2005) himself also made clear in his well-known ‘three chil-
dren speech’ in February 2005 that whilst he was committed to sustainable
development his immediate priorities in his ﬁrst term of oﬃce were econ-
omic. If we had included all policies from January 2004 onwards, the
annual total would be seven rather than one. However, this coding decision
reﬂects an important point about patterns of legislative activity – it is typical
to perceive a drop in the number of proposals being brought forward in the
Figure 1. Environmental policy proposals by year, September 2004–July 2014.
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year of European elections as the legislative cycle is disrupted by the elec-
toral and appointment processes (Burns et al. 2013). The drop of policy
activity in 2009 is therefore to be expected, but Kassim et al. (2017)
suggest that it is more notable than in other election years and has occurred
across all policy sectors. A clear implication here is that the election eﬀect
was exacerbated by the onset of the crisis, however, our data do not
suggest that there were signiﬁcantly fewer environmental policy proposals
that we might otherwise expect.
Our data do suggest clear patterns in the policy sectors being regulated
(See Figure 2). In the 2004–2009 period, a signiﬁcant proportion of legislation
concerned chemicals, which was adopted to support the implementation of
the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals,
which had been adopted in 2003. In the 2009–2014 period, a signiﬁcant pro-
portion focussed upon climate change, as the Commission brought forward
proposals to give eﬀect to its low carbon transition plans (European Commis-
sion 2011).3
There were, however, fewer new pieces of legislation brought forward in
the second Barroso Commission (see Figure 3) compared to the ﬁrst.
Further, when we analysed policy intensity by parliamentary session, we
found that legislation was also less ambitious during 2009–14 than 2004–09
(See Table 2). In particular, during Barroso’s second term of oﬃce, three
times as many (six rather than two) initiatives weakened the status quo and
the number of pieces of legislation rated as ‘moderately ambitious’
dropped signiﬁcantly. Note that we did not judge any items of legislation in
either parliamentary session to be of ‘high ambition’.
Figure 2. Policy proposals by sector, September 2004–July 2014.
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The average intensity of proposed legislation fell from 3.00 between
2004 and 2009 to 2.34 between 2009 and 2014 (Table 2). This drop may
suggest that the Commission was less keen to pursue expansive environ-
mental policies after the ﬁnancial crisis, or cognisant of the preferences
of the Council, engaged in anticipatory compliance by proposing weaker
legislation that it felt had more chance of being accepted. Notably,
certain pieces of legislation do mention the ﬁnancial crisis as a justiﬁcation
for the content of policy. For example, directives on emissions from engines
and oﬀ-road vehicles and tractors were weakened, with the additional costs
on industry cited as a speciﬁc reason for doing so (European Commission
2010b: 2).
So in this case at least the ﬁnancial crisis was used to justify some disman-
tling by default, however, there were no overt attempts to introduce new
pieces of legislation that speciﬁcally weakened existing regulations. There
was one example of a withdrawn proposal (the soils directive), but this had
faced long-standing opposition in the Council from the UK, Germany,
France, the Netherlands and Austria (LexisNexis 2014).
Analysing the score for the ﬁnal policy reveals that the scores increase from
proposal through to legislation. Between 2004 and 2009 the average score
Figure 3. Status of policy proposals (new, repealing, recasting).
Table 2. Intensity of environmental policy proposals 2004–2009, 2009–2014.
Intensity Score 2004–2009 2009–2014
5 (High Ambition) 0 0
4 (Moderate Ambition) 11 (30.6%) 4 (18.6%)
3 (Limited Ambition) 16 (44.4%) 9 (40.6%)
2 (Neutral) 7 (19.4%) 13 (28.1%)
1 (Negative Ambition) 2 (5.6%) 6 (12.5%)
Total 36 (100%) 32 (100%)
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from proposal to ﬁnal legislation increase from 3.03 to 3.12 and between 2009
and 2014 from 2.34 to 2.40.4 This ﬁnding suggests that the co-legislators, the
Council and Parliament were prepared to strengthen legislation despite the
crisis, which ﬁts with other analyses of the co-legislators’ treatment of environ-
mental policy (Burns et al. 2013).
Explanatory themes
In order to complement and explain the patterns of legislative activity
during this period we interviewed stakeholders from the EU’s institutions
and lobbying organisations – all of whom were directly involved in
policy-making. Four dominant themes emerged from the coding exercise:
crisis impacts; pre-existing preference for deregulation; diversity; and the
maturity of the acquis.
Crisis impacts
Most of our interviewees from 2013 felt that policy ambition had weakened
since the ﬁnancial crisis, but that this shift manifested itself in a period of inac-
tivity rather than active dismantling:
The crisis has had an impact because of a much greater awareness of what pri-
orities should be for public expenditure, so amongst taxpayers and member
states who fund the European Union budget there’s the feeling of focusing
on the short-term, which is growth and jobs (Interview 2, 2013).
This quote suggests that the crisis had a direct impact on the EU’s workload,
because the Commission suddenly had to focus many more resources on
trying to address the EU’s economic crisis and subsequent problems in the
Eurozone. Environmental issues were far less of an urgent priority. This view
that the crisis diverted energy and attention from the environment was
shared across our interviewees, including members of COREPER, the Commis-
sion and the European Parliament. One COREPER ofﬁcial suggested that the
Commission had not been sufﬁciently ﬂexible in responding to the crisis,
and had tried to roll out its work-plan regardless (Interview 3, 2013). Unsurpris-
ingly, this was a not a view shared by the Commission ofﬁcials that we inter-
viewed who in general had a more pessimistic outlook on the implications of
the crisis, as did our MEP interviewees.
Furthermore, given that the vast majority of EU environmental policy is
regulatory in nature (rather than distributive or redistributive), a key argument
in favour of dismantling was to reduce constraints on business. In line with
this view, our interviewees often cited environmental regulation as a reason
for not strengthening standards, on the assumption that less ‘green tape’
would enable businesses to operate more easily. For example:
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Legislation is seen as imposing costs on industry, which it frequently does, and
therefore, in an austerity crisis time, you don’t do things like that (Interview 2,
2013).
This focus on the potential costs to business links to the second key theme
that emerged from the interviews, namely the use of the crisis as an excuse
to pursue a pre-existing set of preferences for deregulation.
A preference for deregulation
Several interviewees expressed scepticism about the objectives of those advo-
cating deregulation, arguing that these individuals had been ideologically
opposed to more environmental regulation for some time. It was suggested
that such arguments were inﬂuential in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis,
because other actors became increasingly concerned with stimulating econ-
omic growth and trying to balance government revenues. Signiﬁcantly,
actors who favoured deregulation adopted this strategy to persuade others
of the need to cut ‘green tape’.
This deregulatory zeal was exempliﬁed by the Regulatory Fitness (REFIT)
initiative,5 which the Commission launched in December 2012 as a way of
trying to ‘improve’ the quality of regulation by reducing duplication and clarify-
ing standards, which also provided a useful mechanism through which policy-
makers could push for deregulation. Although some of our interviewees felt
that REFIT was purely focused on making existing legislation easier to under-
stand and implement, others (particularly from NGOs) had a diﬀerent view:
It’s very clear that the whole REFIT exercise is meant to reduce the burden on
business, it is not meant to improve the conservation of biodiversity or the deliv-
ery of public goods or anything else (Interview 4, 2015).
However, our quantitative analysis of legislation proposed in 2013 (the year
after REFIT was launched) does not suggest any signiﬁcant dismantling: we
only ranked one of the seven items proposed in 2013 as weakening existing
provision (three were neutral and three had limited ambition). In other words,
this analysis indicates that the ﬁrst year of the REFIT initiative had minimal
impact on the stringency of environmental legislation. Moreover, the REFIT
consultation exercise applied to the birds and habitats directives ended up
concluding that they were broadly ﬁt for purpose, albeit following a signiﬁ-
cant mobilisation effort by environmental NGOs (Morgan 2016).
Diversity in the member states
Relatedly, several interviewees felt that the increased heterogeneity of EU
states reduced the scope for legislation that does not allow for local ﬂexibility.
Instead, they argued that the EU should focus more on providing a framework
within which member states could determine the most eﬀective way of
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achieving policy objectives, particularly following enlargement at the begin-
ning of the 2000s:
Some of our newermember states inherited a disastrous environmental situation
and obviously they can’t recover in a very short space of time, so they would tend
to be also saying, look, give us more time to deal with this (Interview 2, 2013).
Another interviewee emphasised the point by contrasting current approaches
to policymaking with previous directives that were clearer and more
standardised:
Legislation that is being adopted nowadays… tends to have a huge amount of
loopholes and exemptions and preferential treatments… , we have twenty-
eight member states, we have the Parliament involved, you get a lot more com-
promises now (Interview 5, 2015).
This perspective reﬂects a more general shift within the EU away from
detailed, prescriptive legislation, towards allowing states to develop their
own approaches to implementing policy. This shift stems from a long-stand-
ing EU environmental policy implementation problem (Jordan 1999), and a
recognition that local actors may better understand how to achieve policy
objectives. The accession of thirteen new states to the EU from 2004
onwards has made it more difﬁcult to secure agreement on policy within
the Council and accelerated this shift. In particular, on issues such as
climate change, states dependent on coal and with concerns about energy
security, such as Poland, have adopted a sceptical position on environmental
matters (Jankowska 2017). However, it is worth ﬂagging that the perception of
interviewees that the Parliament and Council are less inclined to be ambitious
does not ﬁt with our ﬁnding that the co-legislators tend to increase the ambi-
tion of legislative proposals.
A ‘mature body’ of legislation
Finally, interviewees felt that the EU had adopted a comprehensive suite of
environmental policy from the 1980s onwards and policy activity is decelerat-
ing naturally. Notably, some interviewees felt that this was a much more
important factor in the EU’s policy deceleration than the ﬁnancial crisis or aus-
terity. For example:
Most of the speciﬁc environmental problems are being tackled by EU legislation,
and…we should focus much more now on the proper implementation of legis-
lation (Interview 6, 2015).
Discussion
What then does our legislative analysis tell us about our hypotheses and how
do these ﬁndings ﬁt with the interview data? There is evidence to support (H1)
12 C. BURNS ET AL.
that there was an initial drop in environmental policy density in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the crisis. However, activity levels picked up again in 2010
and 2011. There is evidence that the degree of ambition in policy proposals
has diminished, as has the number of proposals for new legislation. There
does therefore seem to be some evidence to oﬀer tentative support to (H2)
that there has been a decline in environmental policy intensity post crisis. It
is interesting to note here the perspective of our interviewees regarding
the more frequent use of loopholes and derogations in legislation, which
may explain the perceived drop in intensity. However, our ﬁndings suggest
that the co-legislators generally increased the ambition of Commission propo-
sals in line with the ﬁndings of earlier studies (Burns et al. 2013).
The majority of our interviewees suggested that the economic crisis con-
tributed towards a decline in policy activity and ambition, although they
also suggested potential further explanations for the patterns of legislative
activity that we detected. First, some interviewees suggested that there was
a notable shift away from Europeanised binding regulations due to their impli-
cations for national sovereignty. The increasingly diverse nature of the Union
has led to more ﬂexible legislation to accommodate increased heterogeneity,
signiﬁcantly a greater number of poorer and more environmentally-sceptic
states. This ﬁnding chimes with the wider EU environmental policy literature,
especially on climate change, where it is clear that some of the states that
have joined the EU since 2004 have felt increasingly conﬁdent about expres-
sing their preferences and have been less keen for the EU to pursue an
environmental leadership position (Wurzel et al. 2019). Although the ﬁnal leg-
islative scores for the period were higher than for proposals suggesting that
there has been a willingness to increase the ambition of Commission propo-
sals notwithstanding the challenges of securing agreement.
Second, some interviewees argued that the EU was already addressing the
vast majority of major environmental challenges and green issues were there-
fore no longer a policy priority for the Commission. This narrative suggests
that the high point of environmental policy-making has passed as new
issues assume greater priority on the EU policy agenda. As noted above the
1980s and 1990s were the heyday of EU environmental policy and the vast
majority of key environmental challenges are now addressed via EU legis-
lation. The decline in policy activity may not necessarily reﬂect waning ambi-
tion or leadership but rather a natural reduction. This argument can certainly
explain the decline in the number of new policy proposals in the period we
analysed.
Other work has also pointed to the waning ambition of key environmental
leaders within the EU (Wurzel et al. 2017) and whilst this issue was not raised
in interviews the domestic impacts of the crisis and EU policy saturation may
explain the waning ambition of former environmental pioneers. Economic
competition and the desire to set the policy agenda to reduce the costs of
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domestic adaptation to EU policy was a key explanation for leadership behav-
iour (Börzel 2002). Policy saturation reduces the scope of former leaders to
compete: the economic advantages of setting the EU’s policy agenda are
no longer what they were, particularly during an economic crisis. If the
claim of policy saturation is credible then we should expect to see further
declines in environmental policy activity in the future.
Although the ﬁnancial crisis did coincide with weaker EU environmental
legislation, it did not appear to lead to active dismantling. Given that the EU
is primarily a regulatory institution (Majone 1994) the policy changes
observed involved not strengthening existing standards and reducing new
policy proposals. In many respects then, the ﬁndings of our analysis are rela-
tively positive for environmental protection. Between 2007 and 2010 the
world saw the worst global recession experienced since the 1930s, and
the EU was plunged into a debt crisis that understandably saw most politi-
cal energy and attention diverted to matters of economic and ﬁnancial
governance (Skovgaard 2014). Yet, despite these challenges, the EU
carried on producing environmental policy, and has even managed to
rebuild a credible position on climate change (Bäckstrand and Elgström
2013; Oberthür and Groen 2018), even if no longer a clear global environ-
mental leader.
There are some important caveats though. First, ours is an initial analysis of
the immediate period following the crisis – the following decades may reveal
diﬀerent patterns. Certainly the appointment of Juncker to the Commission
presidency and the personnel appointed to the Commission’s environmental
portfolios raised concerns about the Commission’s commitment to the
environmental policy agenda (Čavoški 2015). Since 2015 the EU has faced
further crisis in the form of Brexit. From an environmental perspective,
Brexit’s eﬀects are likely to vary according to policy area. The shift the
balance of power within the Council may lead to less ambition on climate
change, where the UK has been a leader. However, deregulation and the
REFIT agenda may become less important in the absence of one of the key
advocates of this approach (Burns et al. 2019). What is certain is that although
the height of the ﬁnancial crisis has passed, there will be on-going uncertainty
and disruption in this policy area following Brexit.
The second major caveat is that we have focussed on proposals for legis-
lation, which are a key instrument used to deliver policy. The increased use
of comitology and delegated legislation, especially since 2014 (European Par-
liament 2016), may be the site of behaviour that we have not been able to
capture. We have also not reviewed communications, which typically entail
legislative commitments to be delivered at a later point. An investigation of
patterns of communications over time and of whether the plans contained
within them are delivered would complement our analysis.
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Third, there is a wider policy picture. EU legislation has to be implemented
within states: spending cuts at the national or subnational levels shape the
capacity of public bodies to implement and enforce EU regulations, so it
may be that impacts are being felt there (e.g., Lekakis and Kousis 2013). The
argument that the EU should concentrate on implementing legislation
rather than adopting new policy, shifts responsibility for future policy gains
onto member states many of which are struggling to implement current
commitments.
Conclusion
There have been a range of negative predictions about the impact of the
global ﬁnancial and economic crisis upon the EU in general and speciﬁcally
upon environmental policy. Our analysis takes all environmental policy pro-
posed over a ten-year period spanning the crisis in order to gain an initial
view of the impacts upon the EU’s environmental policy trajectory. We ﬁnd
limited evidence of active dismantling of environmental policy post-crisis.
There was a dip in environmental ambition following the global and
ﬁnancial economic crisis, characterised by fewer proposals in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis and less ambitious legislation in the following years.
Our interviewees, whilst recognising that the ﬁnancial and economic crisis
may have played a role in this waning environmental ambition, pointed to
a range of other credible explanations.
Broadly speaking, our ﬁndings are relatively positive: despite being
buﬀeted by a crisis of extraordinary proportions the EU environmental
acquis has remained relatively resilient. However, there are a number of wor-
rying indicators for future policy development. It is clear that the combined
eﬀects of enlargement and the economic crisis have reduced the EU’s appe-
tite for ambitious environmental policy. The on-going reluctance of former
pioneers to push for more stringent or ambitious policy (Wurzel et al. 2017)
is a further constraint. Whilst none of our interviewees raised it there has
been discussion of the resurgence of inter-governmentalism in the literature–
exempliﬁed in the environment ﬁeld by the involvement of the European
Council in climate negotiations (Burns 2017). This combination of a lack of
ambition from former pioneers, with a greater role taken by member states
may exacerbate the trend of declining policy activity we have identiﬁed,
which has implications for the EU’s international environmental leadership.
As noted in the introduction that leadership has been based on setting a
good example and performing comparatively better than other regions or
states. Whilst the crisis may not have had a major impact on EU environmental
policy ambition it has compounded existing trends and challenges leading us
to conclude that in the medium to long-term the EU’s environmental policy
ambition and activism will continue to wane.
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Notes
1. The list of proposals and the coding are available at URL: https://iaeepresearch.
wordpress.com/research-outputs/.
2. Each interview was coded by date and professional aﬃliation of the interviewee,
transcribed and analysed with core themes identiﬁed. The themes emerged
organically from the text – there was no pre-determined schematic used. Not
all interviewees, especially those in a policy-making environment, were comfor-
table with even non-attributed quotes being used, consequently we only cite
those who gave express permission for us to do so, and numbered according
to the order in which they are cited and the year they were conducted.
3. See Figure 1 in supplemental materials available at https://iaeepresearch.
wordpress.com/research-outputs.
4. These ﬁgures are based on proposals that were substantively completed within
each session and therefore exclude four cases that spanned EP6 and EP7. See
supplemental materials available at https://iaeepresearch.wordpress.com/
research-outputs.
5. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improvi
ng-existing-laws/reﬁt-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly_en.
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